John Laughland is a prominent political analyst and member of the Forum for Democracy (FvD), a Dutch political party. Known for his expertise in international relations, particularly in European affairs, Laughland, a former columnist at The Spectator, has written extensively on topics such as nationalism, sovereignty, and anti-globalism. With a background in history and political science, he has contributed to various publications and discussions on the political dynamics within Europe. Laughland is also involved in FvD International, the party’s international network aimed at promoting anti-globalist values and fostering collaboration between like-minded individuals and organizations worldwide. His work emphasizes the importance of cultural preservation and national sovereignty and challenges the dominant liberal-globalist agenda.
This year, we’ve witnessed globalists launch an all-out offensive on democracy. In Germany, state broadcasters have excluded the AfD, the country’s second-most popular party, from participating in election debates. On top of that, police officers affiliated with the AfD now face the possibility of losing their jobs. Over in Romania, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of the presidential election after Calin Georgescu emerged as the winner. The court pointed to “Russian interference” but has yet to produce any evidence to back this claim. There’s even speculation that Georgescu might be banned outright from running in the election. Considering these extraordinary developments, how do you perceive the state of democracy in the EU, and where do you think it’s headed from here?
Well, as you may know, I’ve been a critic of the European Union for many years, even decades. One of my books is titled “The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea.” We’ve witnessed attacks on democracy in the EU for decades. It began in 1992 with the Danish referendum on Maastricht. The Danes were forced to vote again. There were also two instances in Ireland, in 2001 and 2009, when the Irish voted against European treaties and were compelled to re-vote. In 2005, there were votes in France and the Netherlands against the European Constitution, which were disregarded as the Constitution was simply reworked into the Lisbon Treaty and passed through parliamentary means. In 2016, in the Netherlands, the party I work for, Forum for Democracy, organized and won a referendum against the Ukraine accession agreement, which was also ignored. As everyone knows, there was an attempt in the United States to delegitimize Trump’s election in 2016. And now, of course, the recent events in Romania.
I think the answer has been given by Calin Giorgescu himself in an interview, perhaps the one with Alex Jones. He said, “The globalists are desperate. They’ve been trying to cancel elections and ignoring the outcomes of popular votes for decades. For nearly ten years, certainly since 2016, they’ve been increasing censorship, especially on social networks. We’ve known this since the Twitter files two years ago. They’ve been eager to ban political parties. They frequently discuss banning the AfD. Marine Le Pen in France is facing a declaration of ineligibility. All of this has been building up, and unfortunately, the events in Romania were just the logical continuation of this trend. In a country like many in Eastern Europe, which has become a NATO colony, it wasn’t very difficult for globalist powers to persuade a few judges in Bucharest to make this absurd decision.”
So, to answer your question about where this is all leading, I think Trump’s election has already significantly altered the globalist agenda. They’ve already been defeated on censorship. Musk, as we know, supports freedom of speech. Zuckerberg has even removed his fact-checkers.
These are significant developments. In some ways, they’re almost as important as elections—though not quite—but control of the media and the flow of information is absolutely crucial. Interestingly, during the last French elections, one of the key proposals from the Rassemblement National was to privatize state television companies. That’s a highly significant idea because, in many ways, state-controlled media forms the bedrock of globalist influence.
I’m hesitant to predict the future, but I’d say I’m cautiously optimistic. The situation in Romania is so outrageous that it’s hard to see how they’ll justify it. Then again, they might succeed. Romania is quite a large country, both in population and geography, and it has a long tradition of independence. Even under Ceausescu—who presided over a brutal dictatorship—Romania managed to maintain some autonomy. In fact, it was arguably more independent during the Warsaw Pact than it is now as a NATO member. So, there are signs of hope, though challenges remain.
At the same time, I’ve always said—ever since Trump’s election—that the globalist system still retains a significant amount of power. They have a lot of tools at their disposal. We saw this with Emmanuel Macron’s victory in 2017 and the ongoing cordon sanitaire around the Rassemblement National in France. Even if the AfD performs well in Germany, it’s almost guaranteed that efforts will be made to keep them out of power. The Social Democrats and Christian Democrats will likely form a coalition against them. This has been the norm in Germany for the past 20 years under Angela Merkel. While it’s not the case under Scholz, since the Christian Democrats are not currently in the coalition, it’s far from unprecedented for these two parties to govern together.
So, predicting how this will unfold is difficult—it could go either way.
Thank you. We’ll make a few additional comments on the topics you’ve just mentioned. But before I’d like to return to Romania a bit later but firstly, what do you think—would a Georgescu presidency pose an existential threat to NATO? Is this ultimately about NATO and maintaining peace with Russia? Is that the central issue here?
Well, I do think so. Yes, I believe it’s about that. Yesterday on my podcast, we had Adrian Severin, the former foreign minister of Romania, who emphasized quite strongly that Romania operates under a parliamentary system, and the Romanian president doesn’t wield the same kind of power as the French president. However, politics often revolves around symbolism, and Georgescu’s election would have been a hugely symbolic moment in what is, after all, a relatively large and significant country.
He’s somewhat comparable to Zoran Milanović in Croatia, though I think Georgescu is more articulate. Milanović, from what I gather, has a rough-around-the-edges demeanor, as we say. Georgescu, on the other hand, carries himself with more polish, and Romania, being much larger and more strategically vital than Croatia, makes his potential presidency even more impactful. So yes, I believe it’s very much tied to Ukraine. Georgescu himself has repeatedly stated that it’s fundamentally about war and peace.
As you know, he has consistently emphasized that the issue is about war and peace. For the first time in Romania, you’d hear such a clear, let’s say, pro-peace—though not exactly pro-Russian—perspective articulated so strongly and embraced by the public.
But no, it’s absolutely not pro-Russian. Adrian Severin made this point very effectively. Actually, it wasn’t something I had thought of, but Severin explained it well. He argued that “pro-Russian” is essentially a meaningless term. He pointed out, quite insightfully, that it really just boils down to one thing: if you’re not overtly anti-Russian, then you’re automatically labeled as pro-Russian in the current political vocabulary.
That’s what it means. And Georgescu is not anti-Russian. He wants Romania to stay out of the war. He advocates for peace, which, in other words, implies a defeat for Ukraine. He believes this stance aligns with Romanian national interests. However, that doesn’t mean he has a pro-Russian constituency in Romania. There is some influence in Bessarabia, in Moldova, but Romania, historically and otherwise, has no substantial reason to be pro-Russian. The idea is nonsense.
Could you also comment on Thierry Breton’s recent statement about the EU being responsible for the annulment of the Romanian election and his suggestion that it could be repeated in Germany if necessary? What do you think? Could something similar happen in Germany, particularly with the upcoming elections in February?
Well, I don’t see why not. I mean, it might seem impossible, but Germany is also essentially a NATO colony, and its political class is deeply infiltrated. As for the population, it’s hard to predict how they would react, but we did see massive demonstrations across the country against the AfD early last year. There’s clearly a strong constituency opposing them.
Of course, the AfD has its supporters, but like in France, there’s a very determined and vocal segment of the population firmly against what’s labeled the extreme right, or whatever term you prefer. Unfortunately, I fear such a move might even garner popular support.
In some ways, it might be easier to justify in Germany than in Romania. Georgescu, for instance, isn’t a populist, unlike Simeon or other nationalist leaders in Romania. On the contrary, he’s a very measured and civilized individual—the opposite of a populist. While he may be popular, he doesn’t rely on catchy slogans or stir up nationalist sentiment, at least as far as I can tell.
In contrast, the AfD in Germany and the Rassemblement National in France are loathed by the left, which is likely the majority in France and certainly the majority in Germany. That said, I don’t think the anti-Georgescu sentiment in Romania is comparable to the level of hostility the RN or AfD face in France and Germany.
You mentioned President Trump’s win, and it obviously creates new possibilities for 2025. We’re already seeing some developments. How do you think Trump’s and Mr. Musk’s roles will shape this new conservative global movement, particularly in relation to EU policies?
Well, I think Trump has a strong dislike for the Europeans and holds them in contempt. He obviously feels the same about many of his domestic opponents in America, whom he rightly sees as being similar to the Europeans—particularly the Democrats. To him, it’s essentially the same political battle. He seems to take pleasure in annoying and humiliating them, while sending a clear message to the world, especially to Europeans, that the rules of the game are changing. His “America First” policy means no more pretense about international alliances or global cooperation—it’s all about prioritizing American interests.
Trump also has a very transactional approach to politics. He’s all about the deal, the art of the deal. He wants to sell American liquefied natural gas to Europe and doesn’t care if Germany becomes de-industrialized as a result—it actually benefits America. From his perspective, other states are rivals, and he’d be perfectly content to see companies like Siemens or BASF relocate to the U.S.
Meanwhile, Europeans seem to believe they can step into a leadership role during Trump’s presidency. There are plans circulating in Brussels along those lines. Mark Rutte recently suggested that Europe should spend not 2%, not 5%, but 10% of GDP on NATO and defense capabilities. So, there are definitely some in Europe who are under the illusion that they can replace America while Trump is in office.
But I don’t personally think that Europe has the money or the will to do it. Anyway, we’re obviously seeing the consensus disappear because, as we know, the number of dissident countries is increasing—Hungary first, Slovakia now, Croatia maybe tomorrow, Romania, and so on.
How do you view Musk’s involvement in this new administration? Might he be useful for the conservative cause in the next period?
Well, we’ll have to see. I mean, he annoys all the right people, like Trump. I don’t know how many people listened to Alice Weidel’s interview, but obviously, if he continues to promote her, then who knows what effect that will have. I mean, I see it more as a sort of destructive approach, really, just like I said about Trump. These people don’t care about Europe. Why should they? Why should they care about Europe? Elon Musk was born in South Africa and moved to America. Europe doesn’t mean anything to him.
So I think this new way of doing politics will, yes, obviously destabilize the Europeans severely. But once again, the danger is that they will try to double down and become even more globalist.
And the danger is that, if you like, the capital of the Empire will move from Washington to Brussels.
But I don’t personally think that Europe has the money or the will to do it. Anyway, we’re obviously seeing the consensus disappear because, as we know, the number of dissident countries is increasing—Hungary first, Slovakia now, Croatia maybe tomorrow, Romania, and so on. This censorship and everything—how do you see his involvement in this new administration? Would he, I’d say, be useful for the conservative cause in the next period?
Okay, you mentioned new Greenland policies, but Trump also mentions Canada, even the Panama Canal—like the new Monroe Doctrine is at stake. What do you think about that?
Well, I think, you know, Trump, he demands 150% of what he wants and then ends up getting 100% of what he wants. As I understand it, the remarks about Canada are mainly about trade balances or imbalances, and he wants to correct those. He sees international relations, including with Canada and of course with Europe, as transactional and as a relationship of rivalry—survival of the fittest. So I think he will take a look at what has already been done. That’s what he said—he looks at all the things that America buys from Canada and says, “Well, why do we need all this stuff? We have our own car production and milk production and all the rest of it.” So I think it’s transactional. I think he believes that America has been taken for a ride, has been milked by the Europeans and the Canadians, and he wants to put an end to it.
Okay, but what about the war, Russia, and Mr. Putin? Mr. Trump’s promises that he will end the war or try to make peace. Could we see the war ending in 2025? Could we see a meeting between the President of America and the President of Russia somewhere in Europe, maybe? We’ve heard that Belgrade is a candidate for such a meeting, maybe some other places too. What do you think about that kind of event?
Well, I’ve heard of lots of places—Belgrade, yes, the United Arab Emirates, Budapest, Slovakia. There are all kinds of places saying they want to host this meeting. Where it takes place is irrelevant because the very fact of it happening, if indeed it does, spells the complete destruction of the Ukraine policy of both Joe Biden and the European Union. That policy was based on obviously not talking to Russia, not negotiating with Russia, and instead trying to defeat Russia on the battlefield. The mere fact that Trump has said he wants to talk to Putin and that he seems to be going ahead and arranging it—that alone marks the end of that policy. Whether he will be able to offer the Russians a deal they can accept, I really don’t know. But again, he might because he hates NATO, he hates the Europeans.
He doesn’t want, I don’t believe, America to be involved in any kind of military presence in Ukraine. So I’m relatively optimistic. I also think, by the way, that the Russians—of course, the Russians are losing; the Ukrainians are losing far more men than the Russians—but the Russian losses are very high. They’re very, very high. You know, they’ve probably lost 150,000 men. That’s an awful lot. No European country could possibly sustain those kinds of losses. Obviously, Russia is very big, but it’s still a lot of losses, and I’m sure the Russians are in the market for a peace deal—of course, under their conditions.
But I don’t think they necessarily want to continue this war.
Now, we have more and more countries forming new governments from the right-wing national conservatives. We should maybe mention Austria as the latest example. It seems like Orban is about to have his first Western European ally in the near neighborhood, in the European Council.
We have Mr. Kickl, the leader of the anti-globalist Freedom Party of Austria, who is poised to assume the chancellorship. He has spoken out strongly in favor of peace in Ukraine and more generally, takes an anti-globalist approach to politics. What do you think about this wave in Austria, and what impact could the anti-globalist have on the shadow state in the EU, on the bloc, and on NATO?
Well, I think definitely. Obviously, Austria is not a member of NATO, but again, it’s a matter of symbolism, isn’t it? If he does become federal chancellor in Austria, then yes, it’s another domino to fall. Austria’s power within the EU is not very great, but symbolically, it would be very important.
There’s no doubt, however, that the new direction coming out of Washington is what really matters. Even if the Europeans decide to oppose Trump and try, for instance, to carry on fighting Russia in Ukraine or something similar, I doubt they have the means at their disposal to do it in any effective way. In other words, their ambitions are far beyond their actual capabilities.
Do you expect the EU to take punitive actions against Austria under this new FPÖ leadership?
Not really, no. I don’t think I expect that because they tried it in 2000 under Wolfgang Schüssel, and it didn’t work. It led nowhere. So I would be surprised—but you never know. It’s true that the FPÖ doesn’t provoke the same hysteria as the AfD or the Rassemblement National for various historical reasons. So no, I don’t particularly anticipate that this time.
That said, you can’t exclude anything. They obviously take actions against Hungary—they’ve got their procedure going against Hungary, as we know. So I suppose you can’t rule anything out. But I would have thought the boycott approach, which they tried 25 years ago, is unlikely to work or to be tried again.
What does seem clear is that Central Europe is getting stronger in a conservative sense—Hungary, now Austria, Slovakia, and maybe even the Czech Republic this year. We could be seeing the emergence of a strong anti-globalist core in the middle of Europe. On the other hand, I think it will be limited to Eastern and Central Europe because Western Europe, as we know, has gone very far down the liberal, progressive agenda. There’s a big East-West divide on that.
How would you rate Mr. Wilders’ government in the Netherlands so far? Has it been a disappointment, much like Meloni has been in Italy? How do you see this?
Well, I haven’t been to Italy for a while, and I’ve slightly lost my contacts there, but I don’t get the impression that Meloni is doing badly in terms of public support. The Dutch situation, however, is totally different because, as always, it’s a coalition government. Unlike in Italy, where the coalition parties are more or less all from the right, the ones in the Netherlands are very much centrist parties in the current ruling coalition.
So, of course, there is big disappointment among Wilders’ voters. I think that if there are early elections, he will likely do badly. The effect might be similar to what we mentioned earlier about Austria. That’s what happened to the FPÖ back in 2000—oh yes, and more recently under Kurz with Strache. After the whole Strache-Ibiza scandal, FPÖ support dropped, and they were essentially neutralized by being in government. I think something similar will probably happen in the Netherlands as well.
What is the current position of Forum for Democracy? Mr. Baudet, I see is very active in the Netherlands’ parliament and in criticizing various issues. Do you expect Forum for Democracy to rise in support next time?
I think that Forum will benefit from any disappointment with Wilders. Yes, I do think so. The Netherlands has a purely proportional system, so the possibilities are somewhat limited in that sense. However, Wilders himself has spent decades building up his base, so anything is possible in politics.
That said, I do expect Forum to do well. Absolutely. There is very strong support among the young, which is a good sign. And in a year or two, many of these young people will reach voting age. So yes, things are looking pretty good.
Should people be optimistic about 2025 in the sense that the left-liberal hegemony could be overcome? Could we see a new Europe of national sovereignties and conservatives? We can see it happening country by country, but in the European Parliament, there’s still this division between the ECR, Patriots for Europe (PfE), and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN. )Even so, perhaps we can say that a new conservative, anti-globalist wave is emerging and that the left-liberal era has passed. Are we entering a post-liberal world
Well, we are, from the point of view of America, and once again, Trump will change a lot. I’m less optimistic about Europe. I’m afraid, as I said a moment ago, that the system still has a lot of life left in it and there’s a huge amount of inertia. Many decades of cultural Gramscian hegemony have been built up in Western Europe, particularly in Western Europe. It’s true that in Eastern and Central Europe, the situation is a bit different, but it’s not really that different. I mean, again, France—maybe France will surprise us. Maybe Marine Le Pen will finally win, fourth time lucky or whatever, but even that’s not clear. As I said earlier, the opposition is so violent and vehement against her, so it’s not guaranteed. History is not written in straight lines, unfortunately.
Finally, can you give our readers a sense of the aim of your organization, Forum for Democracy International?
Yes, sure. We aim to be a bit of a forum or center for anti-globalists around the world, in Europe, of course, primarily, but also elsewhere, in the Americas and other parts of the world. We have contacts all over the world, including within the Trump administration. We even published Robert Kennedy’s book some years ago, so we have direct contact with him. So, you know, that’s exactly what we try to do in our relatively modest way. We at Forum for Democracy (FvD) strongly believe that culture and civilization are key. FvD sees itself as much more than a political party—it considers itself a parallel society. For instance, a year or two ago, they set up a Forum application that encourages Forum-friendly people in the Netherlands to do business with each other, use each other’s services, buy from one another, and so on.
