Turkey has been critical of President Donald Trump’s recent proposal for Gaza, which envisions a U.S. takeover of the coastal land strip and the partial or total displacement of its over 2 million residents, to be relocated to Egypt, Jordan, and possibly beyond.
On February 13, 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan labelled it a “major threat to world peace,” calling it “unacceptable” and unfit for serious discussion. Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s position in support of Palestinians remaining in Gaza and compared Trump’s project to a repetition of the 1948 “Nakba” or initial population displacement in Palestine/Israel. Erdogan’s earlier statements from February 9th and 10th were likewise disparaging of the initiative. Turkey’s reaction, in any case, does mirror that of the Muslim world in general, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, who, for their part, have denied that they will host Gaza’s population.
This position aligns with Turkey’s long-standing rhetoric and broader geopolitical posture, albeit critics have tended to characterize Ankara’s support for Gaza as cosmetic, given its continued commercial ties to Israel. However, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad to a Turkish-baked offshoot of al-Qaeda, Turkey enjoys greater regional strategic importance, not to say centrality, than ever before, and may more effectively pursue its interests.
Indeed, domestically, opposing Trump bolsters Erdogan’s self-promoted image as a defender of Muslims, a necessary source of legitimacy given economic struggles and political polarization. Regionally, it has much the same effect, enhances Turkey’s credibility among Arab and Muslim states, especially as it competes with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Turkey has several options to obstruct the US Gaza plan, beginning with the exertion of diplomatic pressure through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or the Arab League, taking advantage of the fact that the populations of most Near Eastern exert some degree of pressure on their governments to adopt an antagonistic position towards the US and Israel. This would fit Turkish ambitions towards regional hegemony. It might also lobby the UN General Assembly for resolutions condemning the plan as a violation of Palestinian self-determination, leveraging its recent criticisms of U.S. unilateralism. There is also space for economic pressure. Turkey’s trade with Israel has fallen in the past year, but it could further reduce trade. It can also impose of cost on the US by funding Gaza through NGOs and other means, making it difficult for the plan to move forward.
Given that Turkey is in NATO and relies on Western markets (including $21 billion worth of U.S. trade in 2023), however, in the short-term, we may expect moderate obstructionism rather than risking serious blowback by over-committing, with a longer-term pivot away from the West. This does not mean that the current bid for regional hegemony will not lead to escalatory power plays going forward (and ultimately, to Turkey playing a key part in the struggle between the US and China on the side of the latter).
