The war in Ukraine, largely sustained by American arms and funding, could now be on the cusp of a resolution. Trump’s administration has upended the Biden-era approach, by seeking an understanding with Moscow. Indeed, in a characteristically brash Truth Social post, Trump derided Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as a “modestly successful comedian” who “played Biden like a fiddle,” wasting $350 billion in a conflict “that never had to start.” Stripped of rhetoric, the message is clear: Trump aims to halt the war because he doesn’t conceive of US interests and geopolitical projections in the same way as the previous administration (and preceding ones).
Negotiations with Russia, reportedly progressing under Trump’s watch, point to a pragmatic exit. This stance should be interpreted not as a retreat from the world-stage but as a recalibration of America’s priorities. Europe, Trump notes, has contributed far less—$150 billion less, by his estimate—than the U.S. to the Ukrainian war effort, despite the conflict’s greater relevance to its security. With an ocean buffering America from Europe, there was always a question as to why Washington should shoulder the lion’s share. It’s in this context that JD Vanceattacked European governments at Munich recently, arguing that their outsourcing of defence to Washington has been irresponsible. But there’s a “humanitarian” case for this hard-nosed approach as well, namely that it the U.S. severs its lifeline to Ukraine, the Eastern European country’s ability to fight will collapse—potentially sparing the nation further devastation.
There is a sense in which getting out of Ukraine corresponds with Trump’s signalling towards a more geographically limited retrenchment in the Western Hemisphere, a kind of renewed Monroe doctrine, in which context he has discussed control of the Panama Canal, buying Greenland and “annexing” Canada.
One theatre likely to interfere with all this, however, is that of the Middle East, where the outlook is far less certain. A Gaza ceasefire brokered by Trump before his inauguration—crafted with adviser Steve Witkoff—has been tenuous and faced repeated violations. Both wars are largely fuelled by American backing, and could significantly de-escalate if the U.S. adopted a more isolationist strategy, but there is next to no chance of the U.S. defunding or ceasing to arm Israel the way it is poised to do with Ukraine.
And yet, the stakes are higher in the Middle East than in Eastern Europe. A prolonged Gaza conflict—or an escalation into Iran, as some fear—would cripple U.S. interests: diplomacy, finance, and global credibility. Peace, conversely, could bolster Trump’s broader agenda. Saudi Arabia, a key player hosting U.S.-Russia talks, will continue to push for a two-state solution, as resuming Abraham Accord normalization is not domestically viable given popular sentiment around the conflict. This impasse interferes with the ability of the U.S. to compete with China’s Belt and Roads initiative, as it would need to stabilize the Middle East and foster favourable relations to set up alternative supply chains.
Trump’s early moves mark a departure from decades of American overextension, but we cannot speak of a historic pivot yet.
