Alexis Troude is a French historian and political analyst with a keen focus on contemporary geopolitics and European politics. Known for his deep insights into nationalist movements and the evolving political landscape in France, he frequently engages in discussions about the future of conservative ideologies in Europe. Troude is particularly recognized for his critical assessments of France’s political establishment and his advocacy for a shift towards patriotic and nationalistic ideals. His expertise and commentary have made him a notable voice in the ongoing debates surrounding France’s role in global geopolitics and its internal political struggles.
France appears to be facing a period of significant instability and crisis. How would you assess the current situation, and what potential scenarios could lead to a change in the Macron government?
Thank you for your question—it’s an important one. You’re absolutely right that France has been experiencing prolonged instability, a trend that began around the end of Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency. Since François Hollande took office in 2012, followed by Emmanuel Macron, the country has faced deep turmoil. This instability stems from widespread public opposition to the reforms these leaders have tried to impose. The population has expressed its discontent in two key ways.
First, through abstention—voter turnout has dropped significantly. Historically, from the era of Charles de Gaulle through François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, around 75% of the population participated in elections. Now, more than half of eligible voters choose not to vote.
Second, through massive street protests. The larger and better-organized these demonstrations are, the harsher the government’s response. Protests have been met with heavy-handed police tactics, sometimes involving forces recruited from suburban areas who act more like militias than law enforcement. Tear gas and other crowd-control measures have been widely used, often with severe consequences.
This pattern of repression started under Hollande’s presidency with protests against labor reform, particularly changes to unemployment benefits under the “Loi Travail.” The government’s response was a major crackdown. Then, in 2018–2019, the Yellow Vest (Gilets Jaunes) movement erupted, initially as a non-political protest. I was there from the first day and remember that many participants were older individuals, especially women earning low wages—around €1,200–€1,400 per month, which is barely enough to survive in Paris. The protests were held every Saturday, not because the demonstrators were unemployed, but because they worked in mid-level professions—small business owners, artisans, hospital staff, and civil servants.
The Macron government quickly became alarmed by the movement’s scale. I personally witnessed police officers violently pushing elderly people, some as old as 80 or 90, onto the pavement. The movement started broad and inclusive, but after two months, it became more overtly patriotic.
I remember, for instance, in January 2019, spending the entire day on the Champs-Élysées. We gathered near the Arc de Triomphe, where Napoleon’s battles and victories are inscribed—a powerful symbol of France. Many of us felt compelled to defend it. We sang patriotic songs like La Marseillaise and Le Strasbourgeois, creating an incredibly emotional atmosphere.
However, as time went on, the movement faced a familiar challenge—division. This is a recurring issue with patriotic movements in France. By the spring of 2019, left-wing parties had gradually taken control, sidelining the original patriotic factions. By 2020, they had fully dominated the movement.
So, we’ve established that the regime is both anti-social and anti-national, marked by repression. Now, however, France appears to be facing an institutional crisis as well, with the fall of multiple governments. Do you see any structural parallels between this situation and historical periods of the 20th century? What potential paths exist for France to emerge from this crisis?
As a historian, I see clear parallels between the current situation in France and the final months of the Fourth Republic in 1957-1958. At that time, the government, led by socialists, was struggling to end the war in Indochina while simultaneously escalating the conflict in Algeria. Widespread protests erupted—one in May 1958 saw a million people in Paris demanding an end to the Algerian War, while others fought to maintain Algeria as part of France. Amid this turmoil, the regime collapsed, and the government turned to an aging Charles de Gaulle, who had been quietly writing his memoirs. Though largely forgotten by younger generations, he was chosen by an old nationalist movement called La Cagoule and returned to power.
The analogy holds today because, in 1958, de Gaulle tasked Michel Debré with drafting a new constitution, creating a presidential system based on majority rule. Now, France faces a crisis due to the absence of a clear majority. The Rassemblement National (RN), the country’s largest party, cannot govern alone with its usual 30-35% of the vote. Unlike systems in most of continental Europe, France lacks proportional representation, meaning a party must secure at least 50% to govern outright—an almost impossible feat. Marine Le Pen refuses to form coalitions with other right-wing parties, further complicating the situation.
Yes, let’s discuss that further. But before we do, what do you make of the charges against Marine Le Pen? You’ve spoken about the regime’s repression in the streets, but this seems to be a case of institutional repression. Is the system so fearful of a victory by patriotic forces that it’s now openly targeting political opponents?
Yes, of course. There are two key points here. The system that has governed France since World War II remains largely unchanged. We know that François Mitterrand had close friends who supported the Vichy regime, and he defended them until the end of his life. In some ways, there’s a parallel with some post-communist countries where the government includes the sons and daughters of former communists. Similarly, in France, many in power are descendants of those connected to the Vichy regime.
This system is deeply tied to the United States and maintains strong connections with it. As a result, it fears any patriotic movement that might challenge its authority. To suppress opposition, it labels Marine Le Pen a fascist and brands all right-wing movements as extremists. Meanwhile, the globalist elites in control of this regime dominate the media, ensuring their narrative prevails.
But how do you think this situation with Ms. Le Pen will ultimately unfold? Do you believe she will succeed?
No, it’s impossible. I agree with Zemmour—she won’t succeed. Let me explain why.
I attended high school at Saint-Croux with Marine Le Pen, and I remember she wasn’t a particularly strong student. She often gravitated toward different groups but never really held her own distinct position. That’s her first major problem—she lacks a clear ideological stance.
For the past 30 years, Rassemblement National has positioned itself as “neither right nor left,” a strategy originally crafted by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a key minister under François Mitterrand. He realized in the 1990s that this approach could take a politician far in France. But because Marine Le Pen doesn’t have a vision of her own, she constantly borrows ideas from others, like Jean-Pierre Chévènement.
Her second problem is preparation—she simply doesn’t do the necessary work. She’s undeniably courageous, engaging with the media and meeting people. We saw in Mayotte how much the public adores her, even comparing her to a modern-day Joan of Arc. But to reach the presidency, she needs more than charisma—she needs expertise. Every time she faced Emmanuel Macron, it became obvious she didn’t grasp key economic theories or policies.
And then there’s the biggest issue—one I’ve believed for 20 years and that more people are now starting to recognize: she doesn’t actually want power. The entire Le Pen family seems content remaining in opposition rather than truly seeking to govern.
Remember Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002 when he unexpectedly beat Jospin in the first round? He was a brilliant speaker, yet that night, he appeared weak and unprepared, struggling to answer questions on television. I believe Marine Le Pen is in the same position—comfortable leading the main opposition party in Parliament but unwilling or unable to take the final step toward real power. And that’s the fundamental weakness of the right in France.
The French Right remains divided, perhaps more so than any other European country. Will it ever be able to overcome the divisions and unite to form a Union dela droite and finally put an end to left-liberal hegemony?
During François Mitterrand’s 14-year presidency, public sentiment was already leaning right. Even then, around 60% of the French people, according to polls, supported stricter immigration policies, financial reforms, and changes to social security—all traditionally right-wing positions. But Mitterrand was politically shrewd. I remember during the 1988 campaign, after having Jacques Chirac as his prime minister from 1986 to 1988, he built his re-election strategy around the idea that France had “the most foolish right wing in the world.”
And in some ways, that remains true today. Right now, between 70-75% of the public supports economic reforms, yet the right-wing parties remain deeply divided. The core problem is Rassemblement National (RN). While it’s the dominant right-wing force, Marine Le Pen is seen by other conservative factions—like Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête and Les Républicains under Éric Ciotti—as too left-leaning.
Why? Because of her “neither left nor right” positioning. She champions policies like lowering the retirement age to 60—typically a leftist stance. For 30 years, RN has been close to power, but Marine Le Pen seems more focused on maintaining her party’s dominance in opposition rather than building a true governing coalition.
The only real path to victory for the French right is unity, but that remains elusive. Les Républicains, once Nicolas Sarkozy’s party, now hold just 6-7% in the polls. Other right-wing movements are even smaller—Reconquête at 3-5%, Les Patriotes at 1-2%, and Debout la France, led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, at 2-3%. Every time one leader proposes uniting, the others refuse. And so, the cycle of division continues.
That’s the issue with the right wing. In my view, the only real hope is Marion Maréchal. She’s much more politically astute. She’s strategically built a foundation by preparing younger generations to take power with right-wing principles. Plus, she has earned respect from the public and the media alike. Unlike Marine Le Pen, who is often labeled a fascist by journalists, Marion Maréchal faces no such criticism. They’re actually afraid of her, especially since she became the youngest deputy in France’s history.
If I understand correctly, Marion Maréchal doesn’t currently have her own party, right? She’s in the European Parliament as part of the ECR group, alongside Nicolas Bay. Could you tell us more about her platform and what’s happening with Nicola Bay?
I know him very well. Like Marion, Nicolas Bay was part of Rassemblement National. However, two years ago, he joined Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête movement because, like me, he believed it had potential. Zemmour was strong, with a solid program and ideas, and his meetings were packed. At one point, polls showed him with over 20% of the population behind him, but he didn’t succeed.
About a year ago, Marion, along with Nicola Bey and Stéphane Ravier, decided to leave Reconquête and form their own parties. Stéphane Ravier started his own movement in the south of France near Marseille, and Marion Maréchal also established her own party.
They believe, and I agree, that they are well-positioned to succeed and that they can create a platform uniting all right-wing parties.
And what is the name of Madam Maréchal’s party?
La France Libre
What do you make of Mr. Bardella’s call to leave the Green Deal policy in the EU to help in that direction and to foster agreements between EPP, ECR, PfE, and ESN?
To keep it brief, I know Jordan Bardella, but I’m not an expert on the Green Deal. However, I can tell you that the French public is generally very environmentally conscious, like many others around the world. But they don’t appreciate being lectured by others on issues like ecology or globalization. I believe Jordan Bardella is trying to align himself with public sentiment on these matters.
President Trump’s victory—what does it signify for France, as well as for national conservatives and patriots globally? Do you believe Trump’s win can be the beginning of something good globally?
Donald Trump’s victory is significant and it could pave the way for potential solutions, like resolving the Kosovo issue. This is a notable win. For conservative parties in France, figures like Éric Zemmour and Sarah Knafo—Zemmour’s deputy in Reconquête—were in New York for Trump’s inauguration, and the National Rally is equally pleased with his win. It’s clear that conservative parties stand to gain support from this.
However, it’s important to note a key difference between France and the U.S. French people aren’t as politically free as Americans. They tend to follow the narratives presented to them through television and social media, lacking the independent political reflection seen in the U.S. or the UK.
I’m a bit pessimistic about this situation. While Trump’s victory is certainly a positive for conservative ideas, the media in France doesn’t reflect that sentiment. Publications like Le Monde, which positions itself as intellectual, are relentlessly critical of Trump. It’s a one-sided approach, similar to the Stalinist method, where left-leaning historians and sociologists dominate the discourse. France, which used to be a beacon of free thought with thinkers like Voltaire and Rousseau, is no longer truly free. Opinion in France is heavily controlled by the media, leaving little room for diverse political perspectives.
What are your thoughts on Trump’s first executive orders regarding gender, environmental policy, migration, and cutting funding for globalist NGOs?
My impression is that his actions are encouraging for the world. From a geopolitical standpoint, I believe he will bring significant change. Take the war in Ukraine, for example.
Since you, Mr. Troude, are an expert on geopolitics, my next question is closely related to the topic you’ve just discussed. I would like to ask for your geopolitical assessment of the current transformation of the global system, particularly in relation to the USA, China, Russia, and BRICS. Should Russia and Europe seek peace now? What is your opinion on that? Additionally, in this new multipolar world, what role do you think NATO will play? Could it return to its original De Gaulle-inspired vision? You can answer these questions separately or together, however you feel most comfortable.
The world balance of power is undergoing a major reconfiguration, as the West is no longer the sole center of power. Other significant powers like Russia, Turkey, and Iran are emerging with regional influence, meaning the West will no longer dominate global control. I’m quite optimistic about this shift because it allows for a reconsideration of relationships between nations, rather than just between large organizations.
Take Africa as an example: Nigeria has stepped in to replace France and the UK as a military power, helping to maintain peace in countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and now Chad. This is a promising shift, as regional powers are now capable of fostering peace within their own regions, rather than relying on NATO, the UN, or former colonial powers like France and the UK.
This reconfiguration also has the potential to foster stronger economic relationships, as new organizations offer these countries better financial opportunities and business prospects. So, in response to your first question, I remain very optimistic about the direction things are heading.
Do you think Europe and Russia should negotiate peace? Should there be efforts to bring about peace between them?
I’ve been thinking a lot about this issue recently. Unfortunately, France has distanced itself from Russia. In France, there’s a prevailing belief that Russia is an Asian country, controlled by barbaric methods and lacking culture. This perception is held not just by the government, but by the general population as well. The elites have strongly embraced revisionism. For example, the director of the Museum of Montpellier, a small city near Marseille, has made a change that even the Nazis didn’t make—he altered the title of a painting by Claude Monet. The painting, originally titled Les Demoiselles Russes (The Russian Girls), was renamed Les Demoiselles Ukrainiennes (The Ukrainian Girls). This is truly astonishing. In Paris, it’s now impossible to see a Russian opera, like one by Tchaikovsky, performed by Ukrainian artists. It’s absurd.
However, when we look at the geopolitical landscape in Europe, Germany is starting to understand that, economically and politically, it cannot move forward without Russia. They’ve been pursuing a policy of gas relations with Russia for decades, and even though they can’t continue this now, they want to resume it. Other countries, like Hungary, the Czech Republic, Italy, Austria, and Central and Southern Europe, will likely pursue similar policies toward Russia in the medium term, over the next five to ten years. France and England, however, may continue to take a different stance.
What about NATO’s active role in this war? What do you think France will or should do? There have even been indications from Macron that NATO is no longer effective, or even “dead.” Could France potentially leave NATO if patriotic forces come into power?
No, no. I remember when Emmanuel Macron stated that NATO is “brain-dead.” Many of us hoped, including the patriotic movements, that France would eventually leave NATO. However, that seems unlikely because the French military is heavily integrated with NATO, which is a crucial factor.
Yes, of course, France is one of the most important states in the alliance. But when considering the transformation of the global system, the role of NATO might change if patriotic forces come to power. However, it’s understandable that it would be very difficult to make such a shift.
For instance, within the right-wing political scene in France, the question of NATO and the European Union remains divisive. Currently, most political programs support remaining in NATO and the EU. The Republicans, including those from Sarkozy’s party, are strongly pro-NATO. After the National Rally (Rassemblement National) and the Republicans, there are very small parties like Debout la République and Les Patriotes, which advocate for leaving NATO, but they only represent 2-3% of the population. As for Reconquête, it’s unfortunate that the party has shifted its position, as it was once against NATO. This change is why, for example, Nicolas Bay left the party. Even Holger Kett, a prominent figure, now supports NATO.
As we approach the final question, I’d like to touch on Jean-Marie Le Pen. His departure marks the end of a significant era for the French right, and his influence is undeniable. As someone with deep knowledge of French intellectual and political history, how do you assess his legacy in France? Did Jean-Marie Le Pen contribute to shaping the conservative platform in any meaningful way? I remember him being one of the first to recognize the “green cheat,” calling environmentalists “watermelons”—green on the outside but red on the inside. I’ll leave it to you to share your thoughts on his impact.
Jean-Marie Le Pen was the main patriot in France for decades. Throughout his career, he embodied patriotism, whether as a young soldier fighting in Algeria or as a deputy in the 1960s. Unfortunately, the French system has long portrayed him as a fascist. Since his death, however, intellectuals are beginning to acknowledge his visionary stance. For example, when he said in the 1980s that France could no longer afford more immigration, he was right. Over time, I believe the perception of his legacy will shift positively, recognizing him as a significant patriot.
What is especially sad is that his grave was desecrated. This marks the first time in France that a politician’s grave has been attacked. It signifies that the leftist factions are pushing for civil war. They want a civil war. Yes.
You mentioned intellectuals, and indeed, France has a long history of influential right-wing intellectuals. How would you assess their role today, especially within academia? Figures like Benoît, for instance, have had a significant influence on the new Russian right, including thinkers like Alexander Dugin. They have provided a strong intellectual foundation for anti-liberal political theory. Could you share your thoughts on this topic?
Yes, that’s an interesting question. For example, we have figures in France who discuss Russia’s significance, but their message isn’t reaching mainstream media. The problem in France is that even intellectuals struggle to express their ideas openly. Take Emmanuel Todd, for instance—he’s a philosopher who created the journal Front Populaire. Michel Onfray, another prominent figure, is known for his visionary work, particularly in his books addressing issues like wokeism. Yet, just this morning, I heard him being criticized on a major radio station, Europe 1. So, the position of intellectuals in France is very weak today.
