Alarico Lazzaro, born on September 1, 2001, in Bari, is an Italian writer, essayist, and political analyst. A graduate in political science from the University of Bari, his academic work focused on the ideological foundations of European conservatism.
His literary contributions include the 2022 publication Éric Zemmour. Un intellettuale in corsa all’Eliseo with Historica Giubilei Regnani, the only Italian book offering a social, political, and cultural analysis of Éric Zemmour’s influence in France. In 2023, he authored a biography of Japanese Emperor Hirohito, followed by La Destra e l’Europa: tra confederalismo, conservatorismo ed eurorealismo in 2024, an exploration of the European right from De Gaulle to contemporary Eastern European euroskepticism.
Currently, Lazzaro serves as the Editor-in-Chief of Nazione Futura and is the President of the Young Confederalists of Europe, the first pan-European youth movement advocating for confederalism.
Alarico, you are part of the emerging wave of young conservative intellectuals. You have authored several significant books and are actively engaged in practical conservative politics. I’d like to know—what first drew you to conservative philosophy and politics? And who have been your most influential intellectual inspirations?
That’s a great question because being a young conservative—especially in Italy—is not always easy. Traditional and right-wing conservatism in Italy has often struggled to gain prominence, not just politically but also in practical and cultural spheres. This is despite the country’s rich intellectual tradition, with figures like Papini, Soffici, Prezzolini, and Montanelli, to name just a few.
For me, being a conservative today means defending enduring principles in a world where ideology itself seems to be fading and failing. The complexity of our time can also be understood through a conservative lens. As Churchill once said, “The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.” This serves as my guiding principle.
Among the thinkers who have shaped my views, Roger Scruton has been one of the most influential. His conversations with Mark Dooley exemplify what it means to fight for history, freedom, religion—even in an era of secularization—as well as for common-sense politics and enduring ideals in an age of mass conformity and depersonalization.
Academically, my intellectual journey began at the University of Bari, where I earned my degree in the history of political doctrines. I studied Europe’s most important conservative thinkers and the ideological foundations of conservatism. Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, and François-René de Chateaubriand are my three favorites. They were the leading intellectual forces behind the counter-revolutions against the French Revolution, resisting not just its violence—an often-overlooked aspect—but also its assault on tradition, monarchy, and the spiritual and romantic dimensions of human life. Chateaubriand, in particular, stands out to me as a personal favorite, a writer whose vision and depth continue to inspire my intellectual path.
This, in essence, is the beginning of my journey in the world of conservative thought.
Wonderful—what a great start. Last year, you published an impressive book, La Destra e l’Europa. Before we delve into the details of your latest work, I’d like to ask about your intellectual trajectory between your graduate thesis and this book.
In that time, you published a fascinating study on Emperor Hirohito, as well as a book on Éric Zemmour and the French conservative intellectual tradition. Could you share what inspired you to write about Hirohito? Which aspects of his life do you consider most significant? Are there any parallels between his leadership and the conservative leaders of his era?
After that, we’ll discuss Zemmour, and then transition to the present political landscape.
Yes, of course—I’d be delighted to discuss this.
My guiding principle in writing books has always been to explore topics that many journalists, writers, and even politicians shy away from. This hesitation often stems from the fact that engaging with history today can be precarious, particularly in an era dominated by cancel culture and mass conformity.
My first book was about Éric Zemmour because, unlike the many businessmen and media figures who have transitioned into politics—such as Donald Trump in the U.S. or Silvio Berlusconi in Italy—Zemmour is an intellectual. It is rare to see an intellectual enter the political arena, which I find regrettable. Too often, politics and culture are treated as separate, even distrustful, spheres, when in reality, they should be united in a larger cultural and ideological battle. This is especially true in the European context, where the battle of ideas is central to shaping the future.
In writing about Zemmour, I aimed to analyze his personality, his books, and his remarkably sharp critique of France’s political and cultural crisis. He positioned himself as a bridge between the Gaullist tradition and the Identitarian movement represented by the Rassemblement National. His Reconquête party introduced a fascinating new dynamic into French politics, highlighting both sociological and ideological tensions.
The French right is notoriously fragmented. For Marine Le Pen, winning the Élysée Palace has become an obsession, yet 2027 may finally be her moment—if she can put forward a credible cultural and political vision. As Jean-Marie Le Pen noted in his memoir, La Tribune du Peuple, a coherent intellectual foundation is necessary for lasting political success. Meanwhile, the Gaullist Républicains are deeply divided, caught between the centrist pragmatism of figures like Valérie Pécresse and the more right-wing stance of Éric Ciotti.
If I had to place my bets on a rising force in French politics, it would be on Identité et Liberté with Marion Maréchal. She is a pragmatic and effective leader, and her strong performance in the European elections alongside Zemmour demonstrated her political acumen. However, I believe Zemmour’s decision to sideline her was a grave mistake—one that undermined much of the progress he had achieved with Reconquête.
Now, Identité et Liberté has surpassed Reconquête in the polls, solidifying its growing influence. Meanwhile, France remains in a state of political, social, and institutional crisis—one that has effectively ended the grandeur envisioned by De Gaulle. Successive leaders have contributed to this decline: Sarkozy, with his disastrous interventionist policies in the Middle East and Libya, which brought significant harm, especially to Italy; Hollande, who failed to confront the looming specter of terrorism; and Macron, who now struggles to define a lasting political legacy. Given this trajectory, I believe 2027 could be a pivotal year for the French right, particularly for Rassemblement National.
As for Hirohito, my interest in Japanese culture and politics has long been a driving force in my work. I believe Western societies have much to learn from Japan’s philosophy of life and its deep reverence for heritage, which continues to shape the nation today. Among contemporary Japanese leaders, Shinzo Abe holds a particularly important place in my personal political pantheon. I was writing Hirohito when Abe was assassinated at the Nara rally—a moment that deeply shocked me.
I dedicated my book on Hirohito to Abe, a leader who championed multilateralism and fostered diplomatic ties even with former geopolitical adversaries. While he was a staunch ally of the United States, he also respected the traditions of nations that had once been in opposition to Japan. His ability to balance historical consciousness with strategic diplomacy exemplifies the power of empathy in building new alliances and reshaping a multipolar world.
My book on Hirohito is the first to be written in Italy after his death, and my aim was to explore and analyze the mind of the emperor—a figure who remains crucial to understanding Japan’s modern evolution.
Writing about Hirohito was not easy, as he remains one of the most complex figures of the Second World War. Japanese totalitarianism was fundamentally different from its German and Italian counterparts, and Hirohito himself became, to some extent, a puppet of the war machine—culminating in the catastrophic tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Hirohito had long been engaged with Western politics, having visited European countries and developed a friendship with figures like David Lloyd George. He admired democracy, yet his influence was ultimately overshadowed by the military’s growing fanaticism and messianic ideology. However, I wanted to highlight the positive aspects of Emperor Shōwa’s role, particularly during Japan’s post-war reconstruction, when he became a vital symbol of national unity—something even Douglas MacArthur recognized. When MacArthur took on the role of Japan’s post-war Shōgun, he reportedly told Hirohito, “Let’s do something for your country, Your Majesty, because you are sacrificing yourself in a way I have never seen.” If you read MacArthur’s Reminiscences, his relationship with Hirohito is truly fascinating.
I tend to write books that explore lesser-known, and sometimes even controversial, aspects of history—topics often ignored or misunderstood by mainstream media. If I may, my latest book, The Right Wing in Europe, as you previously asked, delves into the evolution of two competing sentiments: pro-Europeanism and Euroscepticism.
Many rising political parties have maintained a consistently Eurosceptic stance, but the history of Eurorealism is particularly intriguing. It emerged in Prague with the Občanská demokratická strana (ODS) and a manifesto penned by Czech intellectuals. Their criticism centered on the unequal conditions of EU integration, particularly regarding post-Soviet economies, which were often treated as second-tier (“B-series”) countries. This led them to advocate for a middle path between federalism and hardline Euroscepticism—thus, Eurorealism was born.
Before we dive into practical politics, I’d like to stay on your latest book, The Right and Europe, for a moment. As I understand it, you explore the complex relationship between right-wing ideologies and the supranational structures of the European Union. You also highlight three main ideological currents within the European Parliament’s right-wing factions.
Could you explain these three directions? And do you think the European Right could eventually find common ground and unite?
Yes, this is the great hope we all share. The primary aim of my book was to explore the ideological divisions within the European Right and the broader relationship between Eastern and Western European societies. Today, we see three main currents in the European Parliament: Eurorealism, Euroscepticism, and pro-European federalism. These represent the three ideological “souls” of the European Right.
The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by Giorgia Meloni and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, are the guardians of Eurorealism—a middle path between hardline Euroscepticism (which advocates for an EU exit, à la Brexit) and the progressive liberalism of the Ursula majority. Meanwhile, the European People’s Party (EPP) has drifted away from its ideological roots, prioritizing European federalism over a clear center-right stance. This shift is problematic, especially considering that in Italy, a successful right-wing coalition unites these different factions—a model that has proven electorally viable.
Currently, the European Right is fragmented into three main ideological groups:
- Conservative and confederalist Eurorealism – Represented by ECR, which advocates for a Europe of sovereign nations rather than a centralized superstate.
- Nationalist and identitarian patriotism – Embodied by Patriots for Europe, the new alliance formed by Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, and Matteo Salvini.
- Christian-democratic federalism – A faction within the EPP that often aligns with the left rather than conservatives and nationalists.
Despite these divisions, there are emerging points of cooperation—particularly in opposition to the Green Deal, which could serve as a foundation for broader right-wing unity over the next five years. If we analyze possible areas of convergence, we find several common priorities:
- Opposition to an overcentralized, bureaucratic EU superstate (even some EPP factions, such as Greece’s New Democracy under Mitsotakis and Italy’s Forza Italia, share this concern).
- Resistance to the Green Deal’s ideological excesses and economic burdens.
- Protection of cultural identities and national sovereignty.
- Opposition to uncontrolled immigration.
These shared concerns could serve as a foundation for a more united European Right, particularly in key votes. However, much will depend on whether the Ursula majority remains cohesive or begins to fracture on these critical issues. That said, I don’t believe it will hold together entirely. Over the next five years, I believe there will be opportunities to experiment with cooperation between Patriots for Europe, ECR, and certain factions of the EPP on key policy areas. I certainly hope so.
All right. At this moment in history, we are witnessing fascinating political dynamics. In the United States, a conservative revolution is unfolding, while within the European Union and beyond, significant shifts are also taking place.
In Europe, we already see new national conservative governments, such as in Italy, while key elections are on the horizon in Germany, Austria, Romania, and other countries. Do you think 2025 could mark an ideological shift on a global scale? It seems increasingly clear that the era of left-liberal hegemony is coming to an end.
Yes, absolutely—I agree with you. This shift has been reflected in the European election polls, where we saw a clear movement to the right. While a new Ursula majority was ultimately formed, the right-wing bloc made significant gains, particularly within the two dominant right-wing factions: Patriots for Europe and the ECR group. I had the pleasure of collaborating with ECR on several cultural initiatives, and their influence continues to grow.
We also saw a major victory in Belgium, where the Flemish Alliance secured leadership, meaning the new government will be led by a conservative. The ECR is expanding its presence within the European Council, further solidifying its position.
The German elections present a more complex scenario. Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is expected to achieve strong results, but the political establishment will likely impose strict barriers to their influence. I believe Friedrich Merz will opt for another centrist coalition, likely aligning with the Social Democrats under Scholz, the Liberals, or even the Greens. However, this could ultimately backfire. If the CDU once again collaborates with the left, it risks being perceived by voters as responsible for Germany’s ongoing crises—just as we have seen in the past.
This dynamic mirrors Austria, where the FPÖ has surged in popularity. If Germany follows a similar trajectory, the AfD could emerge as the leading party. Should the government face a crisis, early elections could take place within the next two to three years—potentially reshaping the political landscape and forcing a realignment of alliances.
In recent days, we witnessed peace negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation in Riyadh. Meanwhile, President Macron hosted a separate meeting primarily attended by Western political leaders, with Prime Minister Meloni also in attendance. However, if I’m not mistaken, she didn’t seem particularly enthusiastic about the gathering.
Are we now seeing a new divide within the European Union—one that separates East from West?
Yes, absolutely. If you look at the photo from the meeting, Prime Minister Meloni’s expression is telling. This gathering seemed like an attempt to reassert European unity, but under the leadership of France and Germany—countries that have long viewed Europe in hierarchical terms, dividing it into an “A-tier” and a “B-tier.”
Meloni, however, has demonstrated through her strong cooperation with the Visegrád Group—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—that this division is artificial. In her vision, Europe is truly united in diversity, rather than stratified into first- and second-class nations. From my own experience working on collaborations, partnerships, and events with Eastern European intellectuals, politicians, and journalists, I believe that the so-called “Western” societies—many of which are now in decline—have much to learn from Eastern Europe. These post-Soviet nations have experienced totalitarianism firsthand and now seek a European Union that is not a bureaucratic superstate, not a regulatory behemoth dictating what people should wear, drive, or eat.
On the U.S. side, the next Trump presidency will be markedly different from the first. Trump is no longer an underdog—he won decisively, defeating Kamala Harris with strong support from women, minorities, and young voters. His new administration is also far more prepared, enriched by figures like Elon Musk and key intellectuals. His policy initiatives have been shaped by prominent think tanks such as Americans for Tax Reform and the Heritage Foundation. His choice of J.D. Vance is particularly significant—while Trump connects with the people, Vance communicates effectively with the technocratic elite. We saw this in Munich, where he spoke with calm, intelligence, and strength, like a true intellectual.
As someone who values intellectual politics, I see Vance as one of the most compelling figures on the scene today. In Munich, he pointedly declared that Europe is in decline. But why? Because it clings to the artificial distinction between “A-tier” and “B-tier” nations, because it lacks a coherent foreign policy, and because its Franco-German axis has often dictated policies at the expense of other countries. Look at how Italy’s interests in Libya were sidelined, or how Greece was humiliated by Germany during the debt crisis.
The European Union faces significant structural weaknesses, but as conservatives and patriots, we are ready to address them with pragmatism and common sense.
The approach to foreign policy is a clear reflection of this two-speed Europe. I believe the MAGA movement could prompt Europe to reassess its stance, reconsider its power, and rethink the integration project—not in a centralized federalist manner, but in a more confederal framework that truly values unity in diversity. This principle—being united in diversity—is the foundation of our civilization, and understanding this is essential if we are to move beyond the bureaucratic behemoth that the EU has become.
Of course, MAGA is very different from MEGA, and recognizing these distinctions is crucial in shaping a future that respects both sovereignty and cooperation.
We saw in Munich that Vice President Vance raised critical questions, particularly regarding freedom of speech in the European Union and the impact of cancel culture. How do we assess this emerging alliance between the new big tech figures, such as Elon Musk, and the conservative administration in the United States, in contrast with the European Union’s insistence on outdated policies of censorship, fact-checking, and the defense of the woke status quo?
Yes, exactly. This new alliance between big tech and political power is not unprecedented. Figures like George Soros and Bill Gates have long supported left-wing causes, yet no one raised concerns about potential dangers or undue influence.
Even Elon Musk was once part of the technocratic progressive elite, closely aligned with the Democratic Party until around 2015–2016. He frequently appeared in mainstream media, including popular TV series like The Big Bang Theory—which, interestingly, openly criticized Donald Trump in its final season. This shift highlights how political perspectives influence public perception: if you align with the left, you are part of the mainstream, but if you challenge it, you are immediately labeled as a “fascist,” a “danger,” or an “extremist.”
Of course, Trump will temper Musk’s influence, as big tech in a globalized world—especially with the power of big data—can be a double-edged sword. However, I trust that this new administration will ensure that technological power is used responsibly. In turn, Musk’s involvement may also help moderate Trump, creating a balance that could lead to meaningful and pragmatic governance.
And yes, free speech and the cultural battle over “woke” ideology are among the most crucial issues for the future of the European Union—not only for maintaining economic and financial competitiveness but also for preserving the fundamental battle of ideas. True democracy thrives when diverse perspectives are allowed to coexist and challenge one another. As Voltaire famously said, even if I disagree with your opinion, I will defend your right to express it.
However, the left has increasingly framed political opposition as an existential threat rather than a legitimate alternative. When political discourse shifts from debate to demonization, the consequences can be dire. We have seen this in the attacks on political figures—consider the attempted assassination of Donald Trump or the tragic murder of Shinzo Abe. These acts are the extreme outcome of a messianic narrative that portrays the right as the ultimate enemy.
What we need is a return to a more balanced and moderate approach to politics—one that recognizes that the alternation of power between left and right is the very essence of democracy. Only by fostering open debate and mutual respect can we prevent further polarization and ensure a stable and resilient political landscape.
I have two or three more questions, and the first is particularly important: the role of youth in Europe and beyond. You are not only an intellectual leader but also an active figure in Europe’s youth movements. If I understand correctly, you lead the organization Young Confederalists. Is that correct?
Yes, of course. Strengthening the connection with young voters is crucial for the conservative movement. Many assume that youth automatically align with the left, believing it represents civil rights, environmentalism, and global peace. However, these are often abstract concepts that, in practice, fail to address the real challenges facing our generation—geopolitical instability, economic uncertainty, and societal transformation.
We are witnessing a shift. Many young people are reading and engaging with conservative intellectuals like Roger Scruton and Chateaubriand, realizing that true progress must be rooted in enduring principles. This is the foundation of our work with youth movements across Europe.
The Young Confederates of Europe was established in Brussels with the support of the ECR group, fostering youth leadership and intellectual engagement. I have personally represented the movement at the ECR Youth Leadership Summit in Brussels and was the youngest speaker at the Economic Forum in Karpacz. Our Make Europe Great Again event in Bucharest, held in April 2025, was a defining moment, followed by a second major event in Brussels in January, where delegates from across the world, including members of the Patriots of Europe, joined discussions at the ECR meetings. The movement has since gained traction in Madrid as well.
We are creating a new intellectual and political space for young conservatives—those who reject mass conformity and approach politics with critical, independent thought. Currently, the Young Confederates of Europe has branches in Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Poland, and France, with growing representation in Spain. Our goal is to counterbalance the federalist narrative dominating universities, schools, and political discourse. Instead, we advocate for a Europe of confederated states, united in diversity, reducing bureaucracy, and increasing flexibility—allowing nations to cooperate on key issues while preserving their unique identities.
We are also preparing to publish reflections and scientific papers on EU reform, covering topics like environmental policy, the Green Deal, and immigration. These will be available on our website, open to conservatives, confederalists, and all critical thinkers interested in shaping the future of Europe.
Young voters will play a decisive role in the years ahead, and right-wing parties must engage with them through a cultural and intellectual approach. I have observed that young conservatives often demonstrate a deeper ideological engagement compared to their left-wing counterparts, particularly when confronted with differing opinions. The future belongs to those who think critically, preserve traditions, and innovate with a sense of responsibility.
Culture is the common ground that unites the most important youth leaders of today and the future. That is wonderful to hear. In fact, my aim in concluding this interview was to focus precisely on culture—both in a broad sense and in a more specific context.
With that in mind, perhaps we could discuss the vital role culture plays in conservative politics, as well as its significance in academia.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but my impression is that as left-liberals lose their hold on establishment positions, they are retreating further into universities and academia, turning them into ideological fortresses. We are now seeing the emergence of transnational student movements aligned with the new left, pushing critiques of representative democracy. It appears that, as they struggle in electoral politics, they are instead advocating for more direct democratic models—reminiscent of old communist decision-making structures.
Would you agree with this assessment? How has Italy, under President Meloni’s government, navigated this challenge? How have you dealt with the influence of left-wing academia—an opposition deeply rooted not just in 1968 but in the legacy of Gramsci himself?
Yes, absolutely—about Gramsci. I had the opportunity to interview Mario Maresciali at Atreyu last December, where we discussed this idea of a cultural counter-revolution. She is the co-founder of ISEP in Lyon, one of the first experiments in establishing a private, right-wing university in Europe. Similarly, Budapest has emerged as a key hub for conservative thought, fostering intellectual and metapolitical activity through its universities, foreign affairs institutes, and think tanks. This has been one of the defining cultural achievements of the Orbán presidency.
Italy has also engaged in this intellectual movement. For instance, the Italian think tank Nazione Futura has collaborated with various conservative institutions in Hungary on initiatives like the European Conservatism Working Group, and their efforts have been highly effective.
At the European level, however, academia remains dominated by the left, largely due to the lasting influence of Gramsci and the left’s long-standing strategy of cultural hegemony. However, I don’t believe the right should simply mirror this approach. If we attempt to impose a form of “right-wing hegemony,” we would merely be engaging in the same ideological struggle under a different banner. Instead, we must build and promote our own cultural pantheon, allowing students to make an informed and free choice. When presented with open debate and reasoned arguments, I believe common sense will naturally lead many toward conservative principles.
Conservatism, identitarianism, and traditionalism are not just political stances; they are the foundations for continuity, beauty, and the intergenerational pact that binds the past to the present while guiding us toward the future. This principle is at the heart of Edmund Burke’s philosophy—one of the great intellectual pillars of conservatism.
To borrow a phrase from The Last Samurai—one of my favorite films—those who do not understand their past cannot know where they are going. This deep respect for history and identity is a cornerstone of both Japanese and Italian culture.
